Electoral College History - Part 2

Below is Part 2 of Pat Wilkes 4-part series on the history of the Electoral College:

PART 2 EC PROMOTES UNITY AND ENHANCES MINORITY INTERESTS
There are many reasons to vote NO on proposed Amendment 36. Our current winner-take-all Electoral College system:
1. contributes to the cohesiveness of the country by requiring a distribution of popular support to be elected president
2. enhances the status of minority interests,
3. contributes to the political stability of the nation by encouraging a two-party system, and
4. maintains a federal system of government and representation.

1. Strong regional interests/loyalties have played a great role in American history. The EC system contributes to the cohesiveness of the country by requiring a distribution of popular support to be elected president. Without the EC system, the president would be selected either through the domination of one populous region over the others or through the domination of large metropolitan areas over the rural ones. It is because of the EC that presidential nominees are inclined to select vice presidential running mates from a region other than their own.

In 2004 no one region contains the absolute majority (270) of electoral votes required to elect a president. Thus, presidential candidates have an incentive to pull together coalitions of states/regions rather than to exaggerate regional differences and divide the country. Such a unifying mechanism seems wise when we see the severe regional problems that have typically plagued geographically large nations such as China, India, Russia, and even, in its time, the Roman Empire.

This unifying mechanism does not, however, come without a small price. The price is that it is possible that the candidate who wins a slight majority of popular votes may not be the one elected president in very close popular elections (as in 1888 and 2000)—depending on whether his popularity was concentrated in a few states or whether it was more evenly distributed across the states. Yet as a practical matter, the popular difference between the two candidates would likely be so small that either candidate could govern effectively.

The practical value of requiring a distribution of popular support outweighs whatever sentimental value may attach to obtaining a bare majority of popular support. Indeed, the EC system is designed to work in a rational series of defaults: if, first, a candidate receives a substantial majority of the popular vote, then that candidate is virtually certain to win enough electoral votes to be elected president; second, in the event that the popular vote is extremely close, then the election defaults to that candidate with the best distribution of popular votes (as evidenced by obtaining the absolute majority of electoral votes); third, in the event the country is so divided that no one obtains an absolute majority of electoral votes, then the choice of president defaults to the states in the U.S. House of Representatives. One way or another, then, the winning candidate must demonstrate both a sufficient popular support to govern as well as a sufficient distribution of that support to govern.

2. Far from diminishing minority interests by depressing voter participation, the current EC system actually enhances the status of minority groups. This is because the voters of even small minorities in a state may make the difference between winning all or none of that state's electoral votes. Since ethnic minority groups happen to concentrate in states with the most electoral votes, they assume an importance to presidential candidates well out of proportion to their number. The same principle applies to other special interest groups such as environmentalists, labor unions, farmers, etc.

It is because of this "leverage effect" that the presidency, as an institution, tends to be more sensitive to ethnic minority and other special interest groups than does the Congress as an institution. Changing to a direct election of the president would therefore actually damage minority interests since their votes would be overwhelmed by a national popular majority.
For a history of the development of the Electoral College, see William C. Kimberling's essay, A Brief History of the Electoral College, FEC National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf. Kimberling is the Deputy Director of the FEC's Office of Election Administration. This article provides a historical interpretation of the Electoral College.